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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 18/01/2008

Accident number: 483

Accident time: 09:50

Accident Date: 13/11/2007

Where it occurred: 1.5 km from Kirgochak,
Rudaki District
Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Tajikistan
Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Handling accident

Date of main report: 20/11/2007

ID original source: None

Name of source: TMAC

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: Fuze AP blast

Ground condition: not applicable
Date last modified: 18/01/2008

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:
Coordinates fixed by: GPS

Alt. coord. system:
Map east: E 068 29.952

Map north: N 38 13.3700

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate training (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)

Accident report
The report of this accident was made available in 2007. Its conversion to a DDAS file has led
to some of the formatting being lost. The text of the report is reproduced below, edited for
anonymity. The original files are held on record. They do not include the Annexes at this time.
They have been requested. Text in [ ] is editorial.

BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO DEMINING ACCIDENT
AT KIRGOCHAK ON 13 NOVEMBER 2007
Dushanbe, 20 November 2007

1

INTRODUCTION
1. A mine accident occurred approximately sixty kilometres south of Dushanbe, one-and-ahalf kilometres from the village of Kirgochak, in Rudaki district, at approximately 0950hrs
on 13 November 2007.
2. One person was injured in the accident; twenty-year old [the Victim], an inhabitant of
Rudaki district, got injuries in his left hand and right eye during 10 minutes’ break out of
the demining site where he was working as a deminer for [International demining group].
The accident occurred in the result of detonation of Russian manufactured capsule
detonator Mines-1. After the accident he was immediately evacuated to the Russian
Military Hospital in Dushanbe. See Initial Report of Mine Accident, at Annex A and
Landmine Accident Information Bulletin at Annex B.
3. A Board of Inquiry appointed by the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC) interviewed all
team members, medic, section leaders and team leader as well as [International
demining group] managers. The Board also inspected all equipment involved in the
accident and visited the task site three times to assess the causes of the accident. See
Terms of Reference for Board of Inquiry at Annex C.

SEQUENCE, DOCUMENTATION AND PROCEDURES OF TASKING
4. The task was selected after a tasking from TMAC to [International demining group] and a
subsequent deployment by [International demining group] mine action teams from
Dushanbe. [International demining group] first arrived at this task site on 7th November
2006. The team’s work in the minefield actually started on 13 November 2006. After a
break of some weeks due to poor weather conditions during the 2006-2007 winter
season, the teams restarted works at the site on 23 May 2007 and have been working up
to 1 August 2007. Then according to TMAC instruction, Kirgochak minefield was
temporary stopped and the team was deployed to another site. On 10 October 2007 the
demining team has started its activity in Kirgochak again. [International demining group]
teams have cleared some 5,510 square metres of land so far at this site and destroyed
some 1445 PMN anti-personnel mines there. 46 PMN antipersonnel mines had been
destroyed by explosive demolition on the site on 9 November 2007.
5. Works on the site were regulated by [International demining group]’s Implementation
Plan, TS IS #425, which provides methodology and a schematic illustration of a clearance
method.
6. On Tuesday 13 November the team was checking the cleared area and collecting
fragmentation and debris caused by the demolition of mines on the area on 9 November
2007. [From previous experience, it was known that some of the discovered mines were
still “pinned”, so would not detonate as designed. Detonators and boosters could be
expected to be among the debris found after a “line-demolition” of multiple mines.]

GEOGRAPHY (AREA OF ACCIDENT)
7. The accident occurred near to the village of Kirgochak in the Rudaki District,
approximately 60 kilometres south of Dushanbe, at a Tajik Border Force ammunition
storage depot, close to the headquarters of the Russian 201st Motor Rifle Division.
Lat/Lon N 38 13.3700 E 068 29.952 Elevation is approximately 981 metres above sea
level. See maps and satellite images of site and general area at Annex D.
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8. The general area where the accident occurred is grassy pastureland, wheat fields and
rolling hills. The point of detonation was on an area of ground on a slight incline, at the
distance of 13 m. from the minefield. [The picture below shows the general area.]

[The picture above shows the accident site.]
9. Soil in this region is mostly sandy loam or clay, with few stones or other schist.
10. An unsurfaced track/road onto the area is an extension of a metalled road from the main
Dushanbe-Kurghonteppa road and the task site is easily accessible along this road.
11. Other than the garrison of the Russian Motor Rifle Division, (mostly unknown to
[International demining group] or the Board of Inquiry), the nearest inhabited buildings are
at the village of Kirgochak, approximately one-and-a-half kilometres away to the
northwest from the accident site.
12. Weather conditions at the site on the day of the accident and during the inquiry were dry
(around 16° Celsius) and there was dusty wind and there had been no rain or cold
weather during the preceding week. The ground was dry at the time of the accident.
13. Further images and of the site and the general area are shown at Annex E.

PRIORITY OF TASK
14. The mines at Kirgochak were placed to protect a weapons storage site, and that
"protection" is no longer required. The fencing protecting the minefield has aged and
broken in places. The surrounding land is used by local people and there have been
accidents involving livestock when they enter the mined area through holes in the fencing.

3

There is a concomitant risk of people entering the area in pursuit of valuable livestock.
Although a rural area, Kirgochak is at low altitude, close to populated areas and only an
hour from the city of Dushanbe.
15. The priority of the minefield is "low", but its relatively low altitude and proximity to
Dushanbe makes it possible to work there during the months before the weather in the
mountains allows deminers to deploy to high altitude sites. For this reason, the site is
worked on when there is spare capacity due to difficulty accessing higher priority sites.

SITE LAYOUT AND MARKING
16. The minefield is situated within a strip of ground, approximately ten metres wide and lined
on each side by strands of barbed wire fence, suspended on angle-iron pickets, which are
spaced at ten metre intervals around the minefield. It consists of three rows, each about
two metres apart, of PMN antipersonnel landmines. Mines are spaced approximately
50cm to one metre apart, and the rows continue all around the entire perimeter of the
ammunition storage depot.
17. The minefield is well marked.
18. It was noted during the Board of Inquiry’s investigations at the site, that the clearance
lane where [the Victim] was working, was well marked and was closed.
19. [The Victim] knew his task on that day clearly that he is supposed to collect fragmentation
and debris caused by the demolition of mines on the area on 9 November 2007.
20. The [International demining group] demining team at Kirghochak are living in a tented
camp approximately seven hundred and fifty metres from the minefield. The team have
set up their living area in a field camp with accommodation tents and two field kitchens.
Although it is separated by a barbed wire fence and raised earthworks, the [International
demining group] camp is located adjacent to the Border Force detachment which guards
the ammunition depot. [International demining group] teams at this location are supported
by [International demining group] with sufficient primary health care, shelter, water and
food.
SUPERVISION AND DISCIPLINE ON SITE
21. Ten [International demining group] deminers had been working at this site on this day and
they were managed and monitored by expatriate technical advisor [Name removed],
national supervisor [Name removed] and Team Leader [Name removed].
22. A demining team site logbook was available to record visitors and routine daily events at
the site. See Annex G.
23. [International demining group] report that their managers routinely visit their teams and
work sites on an occasional basis, usually more than once each week. This includes visits
either by the expatriate Project Adviser, the local national Project Manager or the
expatriate Operations Officer or his local national Operations Officer as well as oversight
from expatriate EOD Technical Advisers. Recorded visits from [International demining
group] senior managers and expatriate advisers to this task site prior to 13 of November
were as follows. [Chart containing names removed. Visits were made almost daily by
expatriate Technical Advisors and on 8th November by the TMAC QA Officer.]
24. As it is seen [International demining group]’s expatriate technical advisor was almost
everyday at the site till 8 November. There were no records about the visits by any senior
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officials in the site log book on 9 (46 mines were destroyed), 12 and 13 of November (the
day of accident).
25. At the moment of the accident, after inspection of the deminers, the [expatriate TA] was
near the ambulance about 110 m. far from the minefield. [Name removed] and Section
Leaders [two Names removed] were at the distance of about 60 metres away observing
four deminers. The team leader [Name removed] who was responsible to observe two
deminers was near the second deminer, about 200 m. far from the location of [the Victim].
It is strange how [Name removed] was able to observe these two deminers [at such a
distance]. [Name removed] together with team leader [Name removed] were observing
four deminers at the main entrance. In general 7 observers/supervisors were observing
10 deminers.
QUALITY ASSURANCE
26. On-site management, supervision and Quality Assurance (QA) of works at the task site
are the responsibility of the [International demining group] Team Leader. In support of this
on-site supervisor there is normally a formal regime of internal supervision and inspection
for the work of all of [International demining group]’s Mine Action Teams. Their work is
also regulated by UN International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), Tajikistan National
Mine Action Standards (NMAS) and the organisation’s own Standing Operational
Procedures (SOP).
27. As part of internal Quality Control (QC) procedures, the Supervisor, Team Leader or
Section Leader at the task site is required to check each area cleared to ensure that no
signals are received from a metal detector when it is passed over areas which have been
cleared by a deminer. Such procedures should be recorded on specific Quality Control
reporting forms, which should be part of the on site logbook. In the Logbook not all the
deminers are recorded and not everyday. At the time of writing, no QC reporting forms
have been delivered.
28. As well as [International demining group]’s internal Quality Control, TMAC normally
inspects all task sites through the national Quality Assurance Officer. The most recent
inspections by the TMAC QA Officer were on 8 November 2007. See TMAC QA Reports
at Annex H.
COMMUNICATIONS
29. [International demining group]’s on-site communications network is based on handheld
VHF radios for internal contact within the task site area and on mobile telephones and
satellite telephone for external contact. On site vehicles, normally parked at the camp
site are equipped with CODAN High Frequency radios and are therefore able to
communicate with [International demining group]’s Dushanbe office from Kirgochak camp
site.
30. Routine twice-daily reports are made to [International demining group]’s Dushanbe HQ
office from the Kirgochak task site by mobile telephone or Satellite telephone.
31. On the day of the accident, Team Leader [Name removed] called the Russian Military
Hospital at Dushanbe to inform that a casualty would soon be on the way to them.
MEDICAL AND EMERGENCY SUPPORT
32. All [International demining group] operations normally deploy with a qualified medic as
part of the team; a comprehensive trauma and first aid pack and a fully equipped
ambulance vehicle appropriate to demining operations is provided at every task site. All
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demining personnel receive twenty-four hours of first aid instruction as part of basic
deminer training and a further 16 hours as part of annual refresher training. Medical and
emergency support provided to the team involved in this accident was adequate for the
circumstances.
33. The medic was stationed inside the ambulance. The ambulance was conveniently placed,
inside the perimeter of the ammunition depot and about one hundred metres away from
where the deminers were working. See satellite image at Annex D.
34. National Mine Action Standards require that a casualty evacuation exercise should be
carried out immediately on first arrival at any task site and routinely at least once each
month. This task started on 10 October. The on-site log book records that exercises were
carried out on 10 October and 2 November.
35. Immediate treatment. [International demining group]’s qualified, professional medical
assistance was available to assist and treat [the Victim] within a few minutes immediately
after the accident, before he was evacuated by [International demining group] ambulance
towards the Russian Military Hospital in Dushanbe .
36. After the accident [the Victim] called team leader [Name removed] and informs him not to
worry and he feels well. [The Team Leader] was the first to reach the location of the
accident. [Two names removed] came and tied [the Victim]’s left hand with a rubber and
carried him to the doctor on a stretcher. The team medic [Name removed] after hearing
the explosion and radio communication with [Name removed] (at the distance of 100 m.)
came nearer towards the location of accident, approx. at the distance of 45 m.
37. When the victim was evacuated to the medic, the medic examined his pulse. It was 80
and his blood pressure was 110/70 . [The Victim]’s general condition was normal.
38. At 1000 hours the casualty was removed from the area in the team’s ambulance vehicle,
driven by [Name removed], and taken to the Russian Military Hospital in Dushanbe,
approximately sixty-five kilometres from the site. Immediately on arrival at the hospital,
the doctor of the hospital examined [the Victim] and took him to the surgeon. At the result
of pressing the capsule detonator Mines-1 of the PMN mine by left finger it exploded and
injured the left finger and right eye.
See initial examination report at Annex I.
39. There were light injuries to the victim’s upper lip and above his left eye.
PERSONALITIES INVOLVED
40. [International demining group] expatriate management and advisory team in Dushanbe
consists of four persons:
•

Programme Adviser

•

Operations Manager

•

2 x EOD Technical Advisers

National management team consists of:
•

Project Manager

•

Operations Officer

41. Level of training and experience of supervisory and managerial staff. The EOD specialists
are well qualified and experienced and have been working as Technical Advisers in many
mine action programme. CVs were received from [International demining group] for the
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expatriate Operations Officer. Both national managers have worked for [International
demining group] Dushanbe for more than four years and are consequently very
knowledgeable and experienced about the programme. National Project Manager [Name
removed] is qualified from an International Mine Action middle managers’ course in
Bangkok, 2005.
42. All team members are trained and qualified deminers and all are long-term, experienced
employees of [International demining group]. All personnel have completed and passed at
least one [International demining group] basic deminer training course. Deminers’ Job
Description is shown at Annex J. The level of training and experience of the demining
personnel involved in the incident was adequate. Last deminer refresher training, which
was completed just prior to this team deploying to this work site, was from 07 May to 18
May 2007. Dates and subjects covered during last refresher training are shown at Annex
K.
43. Leave periods and days off work. The team personnel involved in the incident had been
working at the area for one month and their last days of rest were on 24 -29 October. See
attendance record at Annex L.
44. Deminers of Section 4 were not in the site on this day, but the Section leader [Name
removed] was present at the site.
EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS
45. The deminer involved in this accident was deployed with a standard-issue [International
demining group] deminer’s toolkit. The items mentioned below were found at the scene of
the accident.
46. Bucket. A bucket for collecting fragments and debris of mines and other types of metals
was found at the location of the accident. There were 2 pieces of glass, a metallic pin
and a spring from PMN mine, a piece of wire and some other items in the bucket.
According to the statement of [the Victim], during the break at the minefield, when he was
putting the capsule detonator in the bucket, the accident happened.
DETAILS OF THE EXPLOSIVE ITEM - CAPSULE DETONATOR M-1
47. During the investigation it became clear that the explosive item involved, was a capsule
detonator M-1 which is part of MD-9 from PMN mines. For more detailed information, see
Annex M.
48. PMN anti-personnel mines are among the biggest and most powerful antipersonnel mines
deployed anywhere in the world. A PMN is loaded with 240 grams of high explosive and a
9 gram booster charge. It is designed to be operated by 8 to 25Kg of pressure from
above, first by the explosion of capsule detonator M-1 which is part of MD-9. Mine
explosion mainly begins from detonation of М-1.
DRESS & PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
49. The Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) issued by [International demining group] to
their deminers is manufactured by the ROFI company, of Norway http://www.rofi.com/. All
personal protective equipment (PPE) at the site conformed to Paragraph 4 of UN
International Mine Action Standard 10.30, in that it was capable of protecting against the
effects of an explosive blast as follows:
50. Frontal protection. Appropriate to the activity, capable of protecting against the blast
effects of 240g of TNT at 30cm from the closest part of the body.
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51. Eye protection. Capable of retaining integrity against the blast effects of 240g of TNT at
60cm, providing full frontal coverage of face and throat as part of the specified frontal
protection ensemble. Facial visors used by [International demining group] in Tajikistan are
manufactured by Security Devices of Zimbabwe. http://www.secdevinc.com/
52. Visor. Activities it was break time.[The Victim]’s visor was beside him, therefore he got
injuries in his face and his right eye. If he wore his visor his eyes could be protected
100%.
DETAILED ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES ON DAY OF ACCIDENT
53. Activities on the night before the accident followed a normal routine pattern and after
eating dinner at between seven o’clock and eight o’clock, team members, including Daler,
went to their beds between nine o’clock and ten-thirty, the same time as usual.
54. Five deminers were ill. No alcohol or drugs are permitted on the task site area and
deminers are forbidden to consume alcohol during their tours of duty on operational
tasks. During the working hours [the Victim] was also sober.
55. On the day of the accident, team members awoke and arose, as usual, at between six
and six-thirty in the morning. After morning breakfast a routine morning safety briefing
was delivered by the Team Leader and all team members were at work in the minefield
by 8000 hrs.
56. During interviewing the team members, the Board of Inquiry attempted to find out what
subjects the Team Leader had briefed the deminers about during his morning safety
briefing. But the answers were inaccurate, inconsistent and/or contradicted each other or
were not concomitant with known facts or observations. When pressed on this subject,
some deminers stated that the briefing had covered ‘safety in the working lanes’, but were
unable to further elucidate about exactly which safety subjects they had been briefed
upon.
57. The nearest deminer to [the Victim] was at the distance of 70 m. and the other deminer
[Name removed], who together with [the Victim] were supervised by [Name removed],
was working at the distance of about 200m.
58. As [the Supervisor] was near [Name removed] and was not able to observe [the Victim] at
the same time, therefore it seems that the activities prior to the accident were not
according to [International demining group]’s SOP.
59. [The Victim] and the other deminer from the section [Name removed] continued working
until 0950hrs and left the site for 10-minutes’ break.
60. Section Leader [Name removed] states that he was supervising deminer [Name removed]
because he had found a mine. As the distance between the two deminers was about 200
metres, he was not able to observe [the Victim] while he was leaving the site and to see
what he had in his hand.
61. No one was observing or supervising [the Victim] that morning and he was working alone.
Informed conjecture based upon observations at the site and interviews with team
members, supervisors and managers suggests that this is what happened:
62. Up to the time of the rest break, [the Victim] worked the same as everyone else, clearing
up pieces of fragmentation and debris from 9 November, when 46 PMN antipersonnel
mines had been destroyed in situ by explosive demolition.
63. At approximately 0930hrs, [the Victim] found one capsule detonator Mines-1 and
informed [his Supervisor] about it.
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64. [The Supervisor] picked up the item and left it inside a metal pit approx. 6 metres from
[the Victim].
65. Before the break [the Victim] found two more М-1, but he did not inform [the Supervisor].
66. During the break, [the Victim] left his working tools at the lane and took two M-1s in the
bucket and left the minefield.
67. [The Victim came to a location about 13 metres from his lane, sat on the ground, left the
visor at his left side and the bucket at his right side.
68. [The Victim] picked up one of the capsule detonators М-1, which was covered with a
white explosive item M-9, out of the bucket and began to clean it.
69. Then he picked up the second capsule detonator М-1 (which was clean) out of the bucket
and began to pry at it.
70. According to [the Victim]’s statement, he took both M-1s with two left fingers (thumb and
index finger) and was going to leave them in the bucket and at this moment the
detonation of the capsules occurred.
71. At the result of detonation, half of the both fingers were cut and the right eye was injured
due to the fragments of the detonator.
SUMMARY
72. [The Victim] was part of an [International demining group] Mine Clearance Team clearing
an area of ground that they knew was definitely mined with PMN anti-personnel mines,
laid very close together, at intervals of less than one metre between one mine and the
next. The day was a normal working day, but nothing untoward had happened during the
previous twenty-four hours that might affect operations at the site. [The Victim] was
working unsupervised in the first row of the site; the drills and procedures he was using
were probably not in accordance with SOP, but the site was adequately marked.
73. Injuries sustained by [the Victim] did not damage to his PPE. There were no
fragmentations around, the amount of the explosive item was very small and as [the
Victim] himself confirms he was injured at the result of detonation of both capsule
detonators М-1 from M-9 of PMN mine.
CONCLUSIONS
74. Field control inadequacy. There was weakness in command and control, probably
because the Team Leader was not on site. The Section Leader had personally instructed
each deminer specifically and individually about not removing the explosive items, mines
and other suspected items out of the site, activities well about informing him in case of
discovering such items.
75. Management inadequacy. [International demining group] Dushanbe’s interpersonal
communications and briefings as well as their administration and organization were not
fully effective. Although [International demining group] state that managers and
supervisors visited to the task site several times, only the visits of [one expatriate TA] is
recorded in the site logbook during the period of 1-8 November, 2008. During the period
of 8-13 November there are no records, even on the day of destruction of 46 PMN mines.
[Which should have been conducted under expatriate supervision.]
76. Distribution of working lanes to the the deminers. The working lanes assigned to the the
deminers were not adequately distributed by team / section leaders. [The Victim] was
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working in a far distance from his partner deminer. The team leader was not able to
observe [the Victim] from the location of the other deminer.
77. Although there was no deliberate or demonstrable neglect, carelessness or misconduct
by any of the personnel involved, but it is clear that the supervisors at the site were not
supervising him correctly.
78. It was possible to appoint 7 observers for observation of 10 deminers in such a way that
all the deminers could be under the control of the supervisors all the time.
79. Procedures and drills used on this site are not regulated by or articulated in Standing
Operational Procedures and therefore are subject to local interpretation or even
disregard. Although [International demining group] Dushanbe issued an Implementation
Plan, more detailed descriptions of drills and procedures are required in the document.
80. In all the cases when there is a risk that the deminers cannot tackle themselves, they
should immediately address to supervisors or senior officials. This rule was not followed
by [the Victim].
81. According to [the Victim]’s statement, the accident occurred due to the violation of safety
regulations and his own negligence.
RECOMMENDATIONS
82. All members of the team involved in this accident should undergo at least three days’
refresher training.
83. More national managers should be trained and deployed to inspect mine action task sites
and to supervise teams in the minefields.
84. [International demining group] should interpret in more detail way the operations are
conducted and how the deminers should leave the working lane /or minefields.
85. It is necessary to enter the drills and guidelines of leaving the working lane /or minefields
in the training materials.
86. On site briefings need to be improved; Deminers listen, but can’t remember routine
briefings. Briefings should be graphic; use of models, maps and other training aids should
be considered.
87. After any demolition of landmines on the minefield, the area should be properly remarked, under the supervision of the Team Leader, Section Leaders and the Demolition
Supervisor.
88. Procedures for supervisors’ observation and supervision of leading deminers should be
improved and they should undertake closer observation and support to the activities of
the deminers who work even in less risky areas (clear metals) .
89. Team /Section Leaders should check the deminers before they leave the minefield and
assure the deminers do not take any explosive items with them.
90. [International demining group] should train personnel to be able to deal with the
administration required after an accident. E.g. Timeline should have been started by a
nominated person on site immediately the unplanned detonation took place and this
should be practised as part of CASEVAC drills.
91. As recommended in the Board of Inquiry report for the [International demining group]
accidents which have occurred inn the past, the Board of Inquiry recommends once again
that, in order to better reflect good practices and recent developments in mine action,
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[International demining group] Standing Operational Procedures should be reviewed and
updated urgently. As [International demining group] have not responded twice before to
this same recommendation, we further recommend that TMAC requires [International
demining group] to provide an updated and complete SOP by 24 December 2007.
SIGNED: TMAC QA Officer; Acting Head of the Emergency Department of Engineering Unit
at the MoD; TMAC Assistant VA Officer.

Victim Report
Victim number: 646

Name: [Name removed]

Age: 20

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: None

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
minor Eye
minor Face
severe Hand
COMMENT: Half of the thumb and index finger of left hand were cut and the lip and right eye
were injured. No formal Medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the
investigators determined that the field controls in place were inadequate, despite having a
very high supervision ratio. The secondary cause is listed as a “Management control
inadequacy” because it seems that the Victim did not understand the risk posed by the
detonator and so was inadequately trained for the task he was doing. Management must take
responsibility for ensuring that training is both appropriate and effective. It is a further failing of
senior management that the demining group had still not implemented the recommendations
of previous accidents, including the basic need for relevant SOPs.
This international demining group flout the requirements of the National MAC (TMAC) and do
not reach the standards required in the IMAS. They seem to believe that, being the only
demining group operating in Tajikistan, they can ignore the humanitarian requirements and
norms that apply elsewhere. See all other recorded accidents in Tajikistan.
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